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INTRODUCTION 
The 2017 term of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
included fourteen precedential appeals from the Court of 
International Trade (CIT).  Many of these cases turned on the same 
issues analyzed in Federal Circuit cases in prior years, such as when a 
company can escape the presumption that if it operates in China it 
must be part of a non-market economy (NME), or how to properly 
determine the value of goods in order to assess a dumping margin.  A 
few standout cases this term include the Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. 
United States1 case, which addressed the extent to which a foreign 
exporter must be provided notice of a rule change that might affect it; 
the Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co. v. United States2 case, which examined 
whether the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) is 
permitted to depart from the statutory “expected method” for valuing 
goods; and The Container Store v. United States3 case, which provided 
clarity on the definition of unit furniture for classification purposes.4 
Part I outlines the cases addressing the classification of goods, which 
includes much narrower, case-specific findings.  Part II summarizes 
dumping-related matters and administrative reviews of antidumping 
orders, which were addressed in the vast majority of cases this year. 
I. CLASSIFICATION 
All goods imported into the United States must be identified so that 
the proper duties, if any, may be applied.5  This process is known as 
classification and is conducted by the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), a subsection of the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security.6  CBP relies on the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
(HTSUS), a schedule identifying nearly every possible type of 
imported product, to conduct its classifications.7  An importer typically 
provides CBP with its own classification; however, if CBP disagrees, 
then CBP will reclassify the good and charge the importer the 
                                               
 1. 846 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 2. 848 F.3d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 3. 864 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 4. The Container Store, 864 F.3d at 1333; Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co., 848 F.3d at 
1013; Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1372–73. 
 5. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (2012). 
 6. § 1516. 
 7. § 3004(c)(1). 
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appropriate duties.8  If CBP disagrees, it will reclassify the good and 
charge the importer the appropriate duty rate.9  The importer is 
permitted to protest those reclassifications.10 
A. Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States 
In Schlumberger Technology Corp.,11 the Federal Circuit addressed an 
appeal from the CIT regarding the classification of imports from 
China.  In its opinion, the CIT rejected Commerce’s classification of 
Schlumberger Technology’s imported bauxite proppants as other 
“ceramic wares.”12  The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision in 
favor of the importer, Schlumberger.13 
The subject goods are used in oil-well servicing and are used to 
“prevent[] fractures in rock formations from closing.”14  CBP classified 
the bauxite proppants under HTSUS subheading 6909.19.50, “Ceramic 
wares for laboratory, chemical, or other technical uses; ceramic troughs, 
tubs and similar receptacles of a kind used in agriculture; ceramic pots, 
jars and similar articles of a kind used for the conveyance or packing of 
goods:  Other:  Other.”15  This classification resulted in a tariff of four 
percent on the imported goods.16 
Schlumberger contested the classification and argued that the bauxite 
should be classified under HTSUS subheading 2606.00.0060, 
“Aluminum ores and concentrates:  Bauxite, calcined:  Other,” which 
allows the materials to enter the United States duty free.17  CBP denied 
the protest to reclassify the bauxite, and consequently, Schlumberger 
petitioned the CIT for redress.18  The CIT found no reason for CBP to 
classify the bauxite as anything other than bauxite as defined in HTSUS 
subheading 2606 and granted Schlumberger summary judgment.19 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviews summary judgment decisions 
by the CIT de novo.20  To classify merchandise, the Federal Circuit 
                                               
 8. §§ 1484(a)(1)(B), 1500(b). 
 9. § 1514(a). 
 10. § 1514. 
 11. 845 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 12. Id. at 1161, 1162; Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 3d 
1304, 1324 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015), aff’d, 845 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 13. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 845 F.3d at 1168. 
 14. Id. at 1161. 
 15. Id. at 1161–62. 
 16. Id. at 1161. 
 17. Id. at 1162. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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applies a two-part test, considering first what the relevant term within 
the classification provision means and second assesses whether the 
good falls within that classification.21 
The HTSUS governs the classification of all imported goods, and, 
within the HTSUS, there are a number of General Rules of Interpretation 
(“GRI”) that provide guidance on the classification process.22  GRI-1 
provides that the HTSUS headings and chapter or section notes are 
controlling in determining “whether the product at issue is classifiable 
under the heading.”23  In addition, “[a]bsent contrary legislative intent, 
HTSUS terms are to be construed according to their common and 
commercial meanings, which are presumed to be the same.”24 
In this case, the Government argued that the bauxite fell within the 
definition of ceramics because, in the creation of the bauxite 
proppants, the proppants go through a granulation and shaping 
process much like ceramics do when being fired in a kiln.25  However, 
the Federal Circuit concluded that the common definition of 
“shaping” does not include the sieving process through which the 
proppants go.26  Additionally, the examples in the notes section to the 
ceramics heading include flower pots, fittings for doors and windows, 
and other items that seem distinct from the bauxite proppants.27  On 
the contrary, the Federal Circuit found that the proppants fit neatly 
into the heading proposed by Schlumberger.28 
B. The Container Store v. United States 
In The Container Store, the Federal Circuit addressed the proper 
description of elfa® top tracks and hanging standards, imported by The 
Container Store.29  The imported goods were classified by CBP under 
HTSUS heading 8302.41.60 as base metal mountings and fittings 
suitable for buildings.30  The Container Store filed a protest and argued 
that the goods should be classified instead under HTSUS heading 
                                               
 21. Id. (citing Sigma-Tau HealthScience, Inc. v. United States, 838 F.3d 1272, 1276 
(Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
 22. Id. at 1163. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation 
omitted). 
 25. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 845 F.3d at 1161, 1164–65. 
 26. Id. at 1165. 
 27. Id. at 1166. 
 28. Id. at 1166–67. 
 29. The Container Store v. United States, 864 F.3d 1326, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 30. Id. at 1328. 
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9403.90.80 as parts of furniture.31  CBP denied the protests, The 
Container Store appealed, and the CIT upheld CBP’s classification.32 
The HTSUS includes general categories of merchandise, as well as 
particularized subcategories of merchandise in its headings and 
subheadings.33  The GRI for the HTSUS say that CBP is to apply the 
categories in “numerical order, and if a particular rule resolves the 
classification issue, there is no need to examine subsequent rules.”34 
This case addressed the question of whether the top tracks and 
hanging standards, which form the base components for the 
expandable elfa® system, constituted “mountings and fittings suitable 
for furniture” under subheading 8302.42.30, or other “parts of 
furniture” under subheading 9403.90.80.35  The latter includes unit 
furniture, which consists of different elements that fit together to form 
a larger system.36  The Container Store contended that the components 
of the elfa® system are unit furniture and should be classified under 
subheading 9403.90.80.37 
The Federal Circuit agreed with The Container Store and found that 
the top tracks and hanging standards were not furniture in and of 
themselves, but rather the “indispensable structural framework for the 
elfa® modular storage unit.”38  These component parts were not 
covered by heading 8203 and did not fit into the description of goods 
listed in that subheading’s explanatory note.39  Accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit found that the goods were improperly classified and 
thus reversed and remanded the case to the CIT.40 
                                               
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 1328–29; see The Container Store v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 
1348 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016), rev’d, 864 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 33. The Container Store, 864 F.3d at 1329 (citing Wilton Indus., Inc. v. United States, 
741 F.3d 1263, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
 34. Id. at 1329 (citing CamelBak Prods., LLC v. United States, 649 F.3d 1361, 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
 35. Id. at 1330. 
 36. Id. at 1330 (citing StoreWALL, LLC v. United States, 644 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011)) (classifying a similar organizing and storage system as “unit furniture” 
under heading 9403). 
 37. Id. at 1330. 
 38. Id. at 1330–31. 
 39. Id. at 1332 (“Explanatory Note 83.02 does not exclude from heading 8302 any 
mounting or fitting ‘essential’ to an article, but instead excludes only those mountings 
and fittings that ‘form[ ] an essential part of the structure of the article.’”). 
 40. Id. at 1333. 
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C. Chemtall, Inc. v. United States 
In Chemtall, Inc. v. United States,41 the Federal Circuit addressed the proper 
classification of imported acrylamide tertiary butyl sulfonic acid (ATBS).42  
The importer challenged the CBP’s classification of the imported good, 
claiming ATBS was an amide or a derivative or salt of an amide.43  The 
Federal Circuit focused its analysis on the chemical make-up of ATBS and 
concluded that ATBS is not an amide.  Therefore, it is subject to a 6.5% 
duty rate rather than the 3.7% rate applied to Acrylamide.44 
The central element of dispute in Chemtall turns on the meaning of the 
term “derivative” under HTSUS 2924, which applies to both acyclic 
amides and their derivatives.45  While the Government argued that the 
term should refer to compounds that are related in structure, Chemtall 
argued that it should refer to compounds that are chemically derived 
from another compound.46  The CIT found that the common meaning 
of the word “derivative” aligned with the Government’s narrower 
definition.47  Chemtall cited to two organic chemistry textbooks to 
support its interpretation, but the CIT concluded that Chemtall had 
mischaracterized the explanations found in those textbooks.48  
Additionally, both parties relied upon the inconsistent explanatory notes 
to subheading 2924.19.80.00 of the HTSUS, and the CIT did not find the 
explanatory notes helpful in this instance.49  Ultimately, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision and similarly found that the evidence 
supported the Government’s positon that ATBS should be classified as an 
amide and should be subject to the higher duty category.50 
                                               
 41. 878 F.3d 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 42. Id. at 1015. 
 43. Id.  An amide is a nitrogen atom that is limited to having only hydrogen, alkyl, 
or aryl groups bonded to it.  Id. at 1016.  Because ATBS contains sulfonic acid—a 
compound that does not fit within the aforementioned atoms or compounds—the 
issue was whether ATBS could be classified as an amide, or whether it was a derivative 
of such.  Id. at 1022. 
 44. Id. at 1017. 
 45. Id. at 1019.  The Federal Circuit spent considerable time addressing the 
chemical components that make up ATBS.  Id. at 1015–17. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1020–21 (finding that the textbooks cited do not support Chemtall’s 
positions because they “suggest that amides have only hydrogen or hydrocarbyls . . . 
bonded to the nitrogen of the amide functional group”). 
 49. Id. at 1022, 1024–25. 
 50. Id. at 1026–27. 
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II. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES 
Dumping occurs when a foreign exporter purposefully sell goods in the 
United States at a lower price than the domestic market such that the 
importer gains a market share and domestic sellers are harmed.51  
Domestic firms injured as a result of dumping may petition Commerce to 
investigate and levy antidumping duties on the foreign exporters.52  These 
duties are calculated by comparing the normal price for the goods sold 
on the foreign home market and the export price for those same goods.53  
If the margin between those prices is more than de minimis, Commerce 
will use that difference as the dumping margin.54  Targeted dumping is a 
pattern of export prices for comparable merchandise that differ 
significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time.55 
To determine whether an exporter is in fact dumping in the United 
States, Commerce must first establish whether the goods are being sold 
in the United States at less than fair value.  To do so, Commerce must 
determine which prices to use for comparison by applying one of three 
methodologies: 
(1) Average-to-transaction (“A-T”), in which Commerce compares 
the weighted average of the normal values to the export (or 
constructed export prices) of individual transactions.  (2) Average-
to-average (“A-A”), in which Commerce compares the weighted 
average of the normal values to the weighted average of the export 
prices (or constructed export prices).  (3) Transaction-to-
transaction (“T-T”), in which Commerce compares the normal value 
of an individual transaction to the export price (or constructed 
export price) of an individual transaction.56 
In general, Commerce will apply the average-to-average methodology 
unless a particular case requires an exception.57  One such exception to 
this general rule is a case in which “there is a pattern of export prices 
(or constructed export prices) for comparable merchandise that differ 
significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time” and 
Commerce explains why these differences cannot be taken into account 
                                               
 51. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2012); see also Kevin J. Fandl, 2016 International Trade Law 
Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1381, 1382–84 (2018). 
 52. § 1673a. 
 53. Union Steel v. United States, 713 F.3d 1101, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 54. Id. at 1103, 1108. 
 55. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B)(i); see also Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United 
States, 846 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining targeted dumping). 
 56. Apex Frozen Foods, 862 F.3d at 1340–41 (citing Union Steel v. United States, 713 
F.3d 1101, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2013)); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 57. 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(c)(1) (2012). 
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using the average-to-average methodology.58  This exception is meant to 
address concerns over “targeted dumping.”59 
The third methodology is specifically used for cases of alleged targeted 
dumping.60  However, to use that methodology, Commerce must first find 
a pattern indicative of targeted dumping, and then justify its decision not 
to apply one of the first two methods.61  The use of the third method, 
often in combination with a controversial practice called “zeroing,”62 was 
limited by a regulation called the Limiting Regulation.  The Limiting 
Regulation stated that when it applies the third methodology, Commerce 
can only include sales considered to be targeted dumping.63 
In 2008, Commerce eliminated the Limiting Regulation, which had been 
a part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.64  This regulatory withdrawal 
was conducted without following the required notice-and-comment 
process because Commerce asserted an exception for “good cause.”65 
The International Trade Administration (ITA) conducts a second 
investigation to determine whether the domestic industry in the 
United States is materially threatened by the import of the subject 
goods into the United States.66  If the ITA concludes that U.S. industry 
is materially threatened and Commerce identifies a difference in home 
and export market prices, Commerce issues a final determination 
establishing the applicable dumping margins.67  These determinations 
can be challenged by affected parties.68 
A. Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States 
In Mid Continent Nail Corp., the Federal Circuit considered Mid 
Continent Nail’s challenge to the alleged targeted dumping of another 
                                               
 58. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B) (2012). 
 59. Apex Frozen Foods, 862 F.3d at 1341; see also Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United 
States, 846 F.3d 1364, 1376, 1376 n.8 (2017). 
 60. See § 1677f-1(d)(B)(i); Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1369. 
 61. Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1369. 
 62. Id. at 1369–70 (quoting Union Steel v. United States, 713 F.3d 1101, 1104 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013)).  Zeroing refers to the practice in which “negative dumping margins (i.e., 
margins of sales of merchandise sold at nondumped prices) are given a value of zero 
and only positive dumping margins (i.e., margins for sales of merchandise sold at 
dumped prices) are aggregated.”  Id. 
 63. Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1370 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(f)(2) (2008)). 
 64. Id. at 1370 (citing Withdrawal of the Regulatory Provisions Governing 
Targeted Dumping in Antidumping Duty Investigations, Interim Final Rule, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 74,930, 74,931 (Dec. 10, 2008)). 
 65. Id. 
 66. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2)(A)–(B). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Union Steel, 713 F.3d at 1103. 
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nail importer, Precision Fasteners, in light of Commerce’s 
noncompliance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).69  In 2011, 
Commerce applied its third methodology to evaluate potentially 
dumping70 by Precision Fasteners, a defendant in Mid Continent Nail Corp., 
which imports of steel nails from the United Arab Emirates (UAE); 
Commerce ultimately found a dumping margin of 2.51%.71 
The CIT assessed the alleged dumping by reviewing all sales—not 
only targeted dumping sales.72  Precision argued to the CIT that 
Commerce violated the APA by failing to follow the notice-and-
comment procedures when rescinding the Limiting Regulation.73  It 
further contended that, had Commerce applied the Limiting 
Regulation and only considered the sales by Precision that would qualify 
as targeted dumping, Commerce still could not justify the use of the 
average-to-transaction methodology because Commerce had previously 
determined that less than one percent of Precision’s imports constituted 
dumping.74  The CIT agreed that Commerce violated its duties under 
the APA and remanded the decision back to Commerce to reassess 
Precision’s dumping margin utilizing the Limiting Regulation.75 
After correctly applying the Limiting Regulation, Commerce found 
Precision’s dumping to be de minimis and applied a duty rate of zero 
percent.76  Mid Continent Nail again challenged Commerce’s finding, 
arguing that Commerce misapplied the Limiting Regulation.77  The CIT 
affirmed the decision by Commerce on remand.78  Mid Continent Nail 
                                               
 69. Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1368–70. 
 70. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 71. Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1368–71.  In 2011, Mid Continent Nail 
filed a petition with Commerce alleging that certain steel nail imports from the UAE 
resulted in targeted dumping.  Id. at 1368.  When Commerce opened an investigation 
into the matter, it determined that Precision was a “mandatory respondent[], i.e., an 
importer whose dumping rate would be individually determined in the course of the 
investigation.”  Id. at 1368–69.  Mid Continent Nail argued that the Limiting 
Regulation was properly withdrawn, resulting in a dumping margin that meant that 
Precision engaged in targeted dumping, while Precision contended that Commerce 
was required to apply the Limiting Regulation because its 2008 withdrawal notice was 
ineffective.  Id. at 1369–71. 
 72. Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1318–19 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 2014), aff’d, 864 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 73. Id. at 1319–20. 
 74. Id. at 1320. 
 75. Id. at 1321, 1330. 
 76. Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1324 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 2015), aff’d, 846 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 77. Id. at 1326. 
 78. Id. at 1327. 
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appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the decision of the CIT.79 
In the appeal, Mid Continent argued that Commerce’s Request for 
Comment and Proposed Methodology on the Limiting Regulation 
satisfied the notice-and-comment requirement.80  The Request for 
Comment and the Request for Proposed Methodology were issued in 
2007 and 2008, respectively.81  The Request for Comment was 
Commerce’s attempt to solicit feedback on the best method to determine 
the existence of targeted dumping, admitting that it had little experience 
with this process.82  That request was not published as a notice of proposed 
rulemaking.83  In the Request for Proposed Methodology, Commerce 
acknowledged the responses received, proposed a methodology, and 
sought additional comments.84  The Federal Circuit acknowledged 
both of these notices as merely requests for comments on which 
methodology to choose, not notices that would suggest Commerce’s 
intent to withdraw the Limiting Regulation.85 
A final rule must be the “logical outgrowth” of a proposed 
rulemaking.86  Further, a notice of proposed rulemaking must be closely 
connected to the final rule and may not create a rule that would not 
have been reasonably anticipated by the public.87  In Mid Continent Nail 
Corp., the Federal Circuit found that the notices issued by Commerce 
were not notices of withdrawal, and, thus, the withdrawal of the 
Limiting Regulation was not the logical outgrowth of those notices.88 
Because the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the CIT 
Precision maintained its zero duty rate. Therefore, applying the 
withdrawn regulation to this case, Precision had not engaged in 
targeted dumping.89 
                                               
 79. Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 846 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 80. Id. at 1372–73. 
 81. Proposed Methodology for Identifying and Analyzing Target Dumping in 
Antidumping Investigations; Request for Comment, 73 Fed. Reg. 26,371 (May 9, 
2008); Targeted Dumping in Antidumping Investigations; Request for Comment, 72 
Fed. Reg. 60,651 (Oct. 25, 2007). 
 82. 72 Fed. Reg. 60,651 (Oct. 25, 2007). 
 83. Id. 
 84. 73 Fed. Reg. 26,371 (May 9, 2008). 
 85. Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1375–76. 
 86. Id. at 1373; see also Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 n.51 
(D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 87. Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1373. 
 88. Id. at 1370, 1372. 
 89. Id. at 1385. 
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B. American Tubular Products v. United States 
In American Tubular Products v. United States,90 the Federal Circuit 
addressed average surrogate values of oil country tubular goods (OCTG) 
exported from China, a non-market economy (NME).91  Within its 
antidumping inquiry, Commerce asked one of the producers selected as a 
mandatory respondent, Jiangsu Cheng Steel Tube Share Co. (“Chengde”), 
American Tubular’s Chinese exporter, whether it produced goods using 
carbon steel or alloy steel, the former being lower cost.92 
When assessing the fair market value of an export from an NME, 
Commerce utilizes the value from a surrogate market economy.93  
Chengde initially told Commerce that it utilized alloy steel in its 
production; however, it later corrected that statement to say that it utilized 
carbon steel and, at Commerce’s request, provided sample mill 
certificates reflecting the use of carbon steel.94  Commerce accepted the 
sample mill certificates as evidence that Chengde indeed used carbon 
steel in sixteen of nineteen sales and applied the value of carbon steel 
from Indonesia, Chengde’s appointed surrogate country, to those sales.95  
However, Commerce chose to classify all remaining sales as based upon 
alloy steel since the producer did not provide evidence suggesting that the 
producer had exclusively used carbon steel in producing the OCTGs.96  
For the remaining portions of alloy steel, Commerce “used a simple average 
of the surrogate values for carbon and alloy steel . . . [and] recalculated 
Chengde’s weighted average dumping margin as 137.62%.”97 
                                               
 90. 847 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 91. Id. at 1356, 1359–60; 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) (2012) (defining a non-market 
economy as one that “does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing 
structures” such that pricing does not reflect the “fair value of the merchandise”). 
 92. 847 F.3d at 1356–57. 
 93. Id. at 1356 (citing Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the People’s 
Republic of China:  Preliminary Results of the First Antidumping Duty Administrative 
Review, Rescission in Part and Intent to Rescind in Part, 77 Fed. Reg. 34,013, 34,015 
(June 8, 2012)).  When Commerce “conducts an administrative review of imports from 
an NME country,” the imports should be “valued in a surrogate market economy . . . 
country or countries considered to be appropriate” by Commerce.  77 Fed. Reg. 
34,015.  The surrogate market economy country or countries should be “at a level of 
economic development comparable to that of the NME country,” and should be 
“significant producers of comparable merchandise.”  Id. 
 94. Am. Tubular Prods., 847 F.3d at 1357.  The sample mill certificates “contained 
information on the chemical composition of the sampled OCTG, which constituted a 
portion, but not all, of OCTG sold in sixteen of nineteen sales made by Chengde 
during the period of review.”  Id. 
 95. Id. at 1356–57. 
 96. Id. at 1357–58. 
 97. Id. at 1358. 
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The CIT held that Commerce was reasonable in its decision to use 
an average surrogate value of carbon steel and alloy steel and its 
conclusion that Chengde used the more expensive steel input in its 
production process; the Federal Circuit agreed.98  Commerce also found 
evidence that the producer had other contracts in which it utilized alloy 
steel.99  And, because the producer did not provide complete details 
about its sales to prove the exclusive use of carbon steel, Commerce was 
free to make a reasonable decision as to how to calculate the average 
surrogate value of the alloy steel.100 
C. Changzhou Hawd Flooring v. United States 
In Changzhou Hawd Flooring, the Federal Circuit considered whether 
Commerce could depart from the statutory “expected method” applied 
to firms investigated individually in a dumping investigation and instead 
could apply the “separate rate” method without justification.101  The 
appellants, Chinese manufacturers of multilayered hardwood flooring, 
asserted their right to be excluded from a China-wide antidumping duty 
rate applied to firms based upon the firms’ connection to the Chinese 
government.102  The appellants contended that they should be treated 
as independent of the Chinese government.103  Commerce chose not to 
investigate the appellants but applied a separate rate for them that, while 
“not specified numerically,” was more than de minimis.104  The CIT 
supported Commerce’s conclusion, but the Federal Circuit vacated and 
remanded the case.105 
Commerce initiated its investigation into Chinese exporters of 
multilayered, hardwood flooring in 2010, ultimately selecting three 
mandatory respondents for further investigation.106  As an NME, 
Commerce presumes that Chinese firms are state-controlled; however, 
                                               
 98. Id. at 1359–60. 
 99. Id. at 1360 (discussing evidence on the producer’s website, which showed “that 
it sold OCTG made of alloy under two contracts during the period of review”). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co. v. United States, 848 F.3d 1006, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.; Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co. v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1354 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2015), vacated, 848 F.3d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 106. See Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co. v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1376, 1389 
n.31, 1390 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015), vacated, 848 F.3d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining 
that while Commerce received multiple voluntary respondent requests in its 
investigation, they ultimately denied all voluntary requests and selected three 
respondents, including Changzhou Hawd Flooring Company). 
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this presumption is rebuttable.107  In this case, Commerce assigned a 
de minimis duty rate to the three mandatory respondents and a China-
wide duty rate of 25.62%.108  In total, seventy-four firms established 
their independence from the state.109  Commerce applied a separate 
rate to these firms, averaging the de minimis rate and the China-wide 
rate for a final duty rate of 6.41%.110 
This methodology, known as the “expected method” of determining a 
dumping margin, was established in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
as part of the multilateral trade negotiations under the umbrella of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.111  It requires Commerce to 
“weight-average the zero and de minimis margins and margins determined 
pursuant to the facts available, provided that volume data is available.”112  
Only if Commerce finds that this method would not reasonably reflect 
dumping margins can another method be applied.113 
In this case, Commerce selected three firms as representative of the 
Chinese market.114  And, even though those three firms did not 
constitute the majority of exports for these flooring products, the 
Federal Circuit held that Commerce was not permitted to deviate from 
the expected rate methodology unless it found substantial evidence 
that a separate rate was necessary, which Commerce did not do here.115  
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the CIT’s decision and 
remanded the case for further analysis regarding the separate rate 
determination.116 
D. Meridian Products, LLC v. United States 
The dispute in Meridian Products117 began in 2012, when Meridian 
                                               
 107. See Changzhou Wujin Fine Chem. Factory Co. v. United States, 701 F.3d 1367, 
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 108. Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co., 848 F.3d at 1009 (explaining that as part of its 
investigation of multilayered wood flooring from China, Commerce chose the three 
largest exporters by volume as representatives of the market, therefore making them 
mandatory respondents). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) 
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3624 (2012)); see also Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. NO. 103-316, at 873 (1994). 
 112. H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 873. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co. v. United States, 848 F.3d 1006, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 115. Id. at 1012–13. 
 116. Id. at 1013. 
 117. 851 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
1342 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1329 
Products requested a “scope ruling” from Commerce to exclude 
certain aluminum trim kit packages (“trim kits”) from the scope of an 
antidumping order on aluminum extrusions from China.118  
Commerce initially found that the trim kits fell within the order and, 
after a series of appeals and remands, the CIT concluded under protest 
that they fell outside the scope of the order.119  The Government 
appealed the CIT’s decision and the Federal Circuit reversed.120 
Antidumping orders are often broad and cover such a range of 
goods that the orders may unintentionally capture certain related 
goods under the order.121  Accordingly, Commerce is permitted by 
statute to issue scope rulings that define whether certain goods fall 
within a published order.122 
Scope rulings are performed upon request of an interested party.123  
A scope ruling considers three elements that determine whether a 
product is subject to an order.124  First, Commerce considers the text 
of the order itself to assess its defined scope.125  Second, Commerce 
consults descriptions of the product in other sources.126  And finally, 
Commerce weighs other factors that compare the specific product to 
the product outlined in the order.127  Once Commerce makes this 
evaluation, courts give substantial deference to its expert 
interpretation of its own antidumping orders.128 
In Meridian, Commerce determined that the merchandise in 
question fell within the scope of the order, which Meridian 
challenged.129  The CIT disagreed and encouraged Commerce to 
reevaluate its position, finding that “[c]ontext renders unreasonable 
Commerce’s reading of the exclusionary language of the scope.”130  
However, the Federal Circuit found that the CIT interpreted the 
                                               
 118. Id. at 1378. 
 119. Meridian Prods. v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1331 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2016), rev’d, 851 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 120. Meridian Prods., 851 F.3d at 1385. 
 121. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(a) (2005) (stating that issues regarding the scope of an 
antidumping or countervailing duty order can arise because the descriptions of a 
merchandise contained within the orders “must be written in general terms”). 
 122. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi) (2012). 
 123. Meridian Prods., 851 F.3d at 1379. 
 124. Id. at 1381. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. King Supply Co. v. United States, 674 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 129. Meridian Prods., 851 F.3d at 1378. 
 130. Meridian Prods. v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1316 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2015), rev’d, 851 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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procedure to analyze scope rulings too narrowly, taking away from the 
broad discretion afforded Commerce in such interpretations.131  The 
Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s decision and ordered the CIT to 
reinstate Commerce’s original conclusion because, in the Federal 
Circuit’s opinion, Commerce reasonably interpreted the order and the 
order’s exclusions to include Meridian’s products.132 
E. Boomerang Tube LLC v. United States 
Boomerang Tube LLC v. United States133 involved a dispute over the 
determination of normal value to set a dumping margin for Saudi 
exporters of OCTG products.134  Commerce issued a preliminary 
antidumping order on OCTG products originating in Saudi Arabia, as 
well as other countries, and sought input from Duferco, the largest of 
fourteen known Saudi OCTG exporters and the sole mandatory 
respondent.135  Commerce sought data to determine the arms-length 
sales price to calculate the “normal value” of the exported products.136  
After determining that Duferco had no arms-length domestic sales, 
Commerce followed the constructed value approach by using profit 
figures from Saudi Steel Pipes Company.137  Boomerang, a Missouri-
based OCTG seller, objected to the use of Saudi Steel data because 
Boomerang argued it was more similar to a pipeline producer rather 
than an OCTG producer.138  Alternatively, Duferco suggested using the 
financial statement of an unaffiliated buyer or an affiliated Colombian 
distributor.139  Ultimately, Commerce decided to use the Colombian 
sales to determine the normal value.140 
Boomerang further argued that Commerce failed to collapse the 
affiliated Colombian distributor costs into the sales data, thereby giving 
Duferco and other Saudi exporters a de minimis dumping margin that 
resulted in Commerce terminating the dumping investigation.141  
Duferco countered by arguing that Boomerang failed to exhaust its 
                                               
 131. Meridian Prods., 851 F.3d at 1382–84. 
 132. Id. at 1384–85. 
 133. 856 F.3d 908 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 134. Id. at 910–11. 
 135. Id. at 909–10. 
 136. Id. at 910. 
 137. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(2)(B)(iii) (2012) (explaining the constructed value 
process); Boomerang Tube, 856 F.3d at 910. 
 138. Boomerang Tube, 856 F.3d at 910. 
 139. Id. at 910–11. 
 140. Id. at 911. 
 141. Id. at 909–12. 
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administrative remedies during the preliminary investigation.142  The CIT 
agreed with Boomerang’s argument and held that Boomerang did not 
have to raise these objections during the investigation because Commerce 
gave no indication of its plans to rely on the Colombian data.143 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the CIT’s findings and 
held that it was evident Commerce might rely on the Colombian data, 
and that Boomerang had an opportunity to object but failed to do so.144  
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded the CIT should have 
dismissed Boomerang’s appeal because Boomerang had not exhausted 
its administrative remedies.145  Since the CIT’s failure to dismiss 
Boomerang’s appeal constituted an abuse of discretion, the Federal 
Circuit vacated the CIT’s decision and remanded the matter.146 
F. Suntec Industries Co. v. United States 
The Federal Circuit in Suntec Industries Co. v. United States147 
addressed notice obligations of domestic entities to foreign entities 
during an administrative review.148  Suntec, a Chinese exporter, was 
subject to a 2008 antidumping order covering certain steel nails from 
China.149  Mid Continent Nail Corporation, a domestic entity, 
requested that Commerce conduct its third administrative review of 
the 2008 antidumping order; however, Mid Continent violated its 
regulatory service obligation by failing to notify Suntec, which was 
named in the antidumping order and in Mid Continent’s request, of 
the review.150  Because of this violation and Suntec’s “lapse in its 
relationship with the counsel who had been its representative for years 
in the steel-nail proceedings,” Suntec became aware of the order only 
after (or shortly before) it had been finalized.151  Suntec complained 
                                               
 142. Id. at 911. 
 143. Id. at 911–12. 
 144. Id. at 913. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. 857 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 148. Id. at 1364. 
 149. Id. at 1365. 
 150. Id. at 1364, 1365. 
 151. Id. at 1364.  See generally Certain Steel Nails from the People’s Republic of 
China:  Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Partial Affirmative 
Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,977 (June 16, 2008) 
(explaining Commerce’s preliminary determination that certain Chinese steel nail 
importers were engaging in dumping, and Commerce’s final determination subjecting 
Suntec, among other companies, to a duty rate of 21.24% and suspending all 
liquidation of subject merchandise). 
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to the CIT that Mid Continent’s failure to notify it of the investigation 
should merit the setting aside of the order with respect to Suntec.152  
The CIT disagreed, concluding that the publication of the initial 
investigation in the Federal Register provided sufficient notice.153  The 
Federal Circuit agreed.154 
Suntec, which had been assigned a separate duty rate of 21.24% 
during the first two administrative reviews, was subjected to the all-
China rate of 118.04% because it did not participate in the third 
administrative review.155  Suntec contended that Mid Continent’s service 
failure prejudiced Suntec’s opportunity to participate in the third 
review.156  However, the Federal Circuit found that while this failure may 
excuse Suntec from the investigation, Commerce’s publication in the 
Federal Register of its intent to investigate was sufficient to put Suntec 
on notice, especially because Suntec was named in the antidumping 
order and had participated in the first two administrative reviews.157 
G. United States v. American Home Assurance Co. 
In United States v. American Home Assurance Co.,158 a surety, American 
Home Assurance Company (“AHAC”), provided bonds to three 
separate importers of crawfish tail meat and preserved mushrooms from 
China.159  The bonds required AHAC to pay any duty, tax, or charge 
resulting from the covered activities up to the face amount of the 
bonds.160  CBP liquidated the importers’ entries of these goods and 
assessed antidumping duties, but the importers failed to pay the 
duties.161  Accordingly, AHAC, as the surety, became obligated to pay.162  
CBP notified AHAC of the its intent to charge interest for non-payment 
on the bonds, but AHAC still failed to pay.163  Ultimately, the 
Government sued AHAC at the CIT for the monies due and for 
                                               
 152. Suntec Indus., 857 F.3d at 1364–65. 
 153. Id. at 1365. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1365–66. 
 156. Id. at 1366. 
 157. See id. at 1366, 1369–72 (concluding that the default rule that notices published 
in the Federal Register constitute effective notice as a matter of law extends to foreign 
importers); Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews 
and Requests for Revocations in Part, 76 Fed. Reg. 61,076, 61,078, 61,082 (Oct. 3, 2011). 
 158. 857 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 159. Id. at 1332. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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equitable and statutory prejudgment interest.164 
The central issue in this case was whether the CIT could award CBP 
both statutory and equitable prejudgment interest or whether that 
would, as AHAC argued, over-compensate the Government.165  Statutory 
prejudgment interest is set at six percent and is charged monthly 
beginning thirty days after liquidation.166  The CIT may also award 
equitable interest “to compensate for the loss of use of money” prior to 
judgment.167  The amount of equitable interest is determined using 
common law principles.168  Here, CBP argued that it should be able to 
charge both types of prejudgment interest, while AHAC argued that 
this would overcompensate the Government.169  Here, in its judgment 
on the pleadings, the CIT disagreed and denied the Government’s 
request for both forms of prejudgment interest.170 
The Federal Circuit explained that equitable remedies generally are 
unavailable when statutory remedies are available and would suffice.171  
However, the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 
expressly permits the charging of both types of prejudgment interest.172  
The Act states that “[e]quitable interest under common law and interest 
under . . . 19 U.S.C. [§] 580 [may be] awarded by a court against a surety 
under its bond for late payment of antidumping duties.”173  Thus, the 
Federal Circuit found that the CIT did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to award both types of prejudgment interest.174 
The next question the Federal Circuit addressed is whether the CIT is 
                                               
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 1332–33. 
 166. See 19 U.S.C. § 580 (2012) (“Upon all bonds, on which suits are brought for 
the recovery of duties, interest shall be allowed, at the rate of [six] per centum a year, 
from the time when said bonds became due.”); Am. Home Assurance Co., 857 F.3d at 
1335. 
 167. See Am. Home Assurance Co., 857 F.3d at 1333 (citing Princess Cruises, Inc. v. 
United States, 397 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 168. See id. at 1333 (explaining that a judge may consider “the degree of 
wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, the availability of alternative investment 
opportunities to the plaintiff, whether the plaintiff delayed bringing the action, and 
other fundamental considerations of fairness” in deciding whether to award equitable 
prejudgment interest). 
 169. Id. at 1332–33. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 1333. 
 172. See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, 
§ 605(c)(2), 130 Stat. 122, 187–88 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 4401); Am. Home 
Assurance Co., 857 F.3d at 1334. 
 173. § 605(c)(2)(C). 
 174. Am. Home Assurance Co., 857 F.3d at 1334. 
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obligated to direct CBP to charge both types of prejudgment interest.175  
To this question, the Federal Circuit concluded that the CIT has the 
discretion to decide whether it wishes to authorize the award of both 
equitable and statutory prejudgment interest or whether only statutory 
will be permitted.176  The Federal Circuit upheld the decision of the CIT 
only to authorize the award of equitable interest.177 
H. Maverick Tube Corp. v. United States 
In Maverick Tube Corp. v. United States,178 an exporter objected to 
Commerce’s use of an adverse-facts-available (AFA) rate in a 
countervailing duty investigation after the exporter failed to comply with 
an information request from Commerce that it considered too 
burdensome.179  Upon beginning its investigation into allegations that 
the Government of Turkey was providing countervailing duty subsidies 
for producers of OCTGs, Commerce selected Borusan Mannesmann 
Boru Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S. and Borusan Istikbal Ticaret (collectively, 
“Borusan”) as mandatory respondents.180  Commerce sent Borusan a 
questionnaire inquiring about Borusan’s use of hot-rolled steel in its 
production of OCTG.181  Borusan responded that while it had three 
factories during the period of investigation, only one of those factories 
produced subject OCTG.182  Borusan proceeded to provide the data for 
the one factory, but “noted that it had difficulty compiling that 
information” because the process was “burdensome,” would take its staff 
over two weeks to complete, and would require Borusan to print over 
300 pages.183  Further, Borusan failed to provide data on the other two 
locations, arguing that requiring that data “would impose great 
burdens . . . for no purpose.”184  When Commerce pressed Borusan for 
data on the other two locations, Borusan failed to comply, citing its 
                                               
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. (“We conclude that the Trade Court retains broad discretion to apply 
nonstatutory prejudgment interest according to traditional equitable principles, which 
is exactly what it did in this case.”). 
 178. 857 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Maverick Tube I]. 
 179. Id. at 1355–56; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (2012) (providing that Commerce 
may employ an inference adverse to a party’s interests if that party has failed to comply 
with a request for information). 
 180. Maverick Tube I, 857 F.3d at 1355.  The Federal Circuit treated both companies 
as a single respondent.  See id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 1355–56. 
 184. Id. at 1356. 
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difficulties in collecting data on the first location.185  In response, 
Borusan attempted to explain its burdens to Commerce by invoking 19 
U.S.C. § 1677m(c)(1).186  Nonetheless, Commerce ultimately issued 
Borusan an AFA duty rate, which Borusan challenged at the CIT.187 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Government, finding that 
Borusan failed to comply with Commerce’s request for information or 
provide a reasonable justification for why it could not provide that 
information: 
If [Commerce] . . . finds that an interested party has failed to 
cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with a 
request for information from [Commerce], [then Commerce] . . . 
may use an inference that is adverse to the interests of that party in 
selecting from among the facts otherwise available.188 
The Federal Circuit explained that Commerce lacks subpoena power 
and thus must use the threat of AFA to incentivize a response from 
respondents.189  Commerce cannot force a respondent to provide 
information that it needs to calculate values used in dumping and subsidy 
investigations. Thus, its power to disincentivize non-responses with the use 
of AFA findings, which are generally less favorable to the respondent, 
serves as a viable means to encourage participation in its investigation. 
I. Maverick Tube Corp. v. Toscelik Profil ve Sac Endustrisi A.S. 
Commerce’s antidumping investigation into Turkish OCTGs was 
back before the Federal Circuit approximately one month later.190  In 
Maverick Tube Corp. v. Toscelik Profil ve Sac Endustrisi A.S.,191 the Federal 
Circuit addressed duty drawbacks and their effects on dumping margin 
calculations.192  A duty drawback occurs when an exporter subject to 
                                               
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
[I]f an interested party notifies Commerce promptly after receiving a request 
that it is “unable to submit the information requested in the requested form 
and manner, together with a full explanation and suggested alternative 
forms,” then Commerce “shall consider the ability of the interested party” and 
“may modify such requirements to the extent necessary to avoid imposing an 
unreasonable burden on that party.” 
Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(c)(1) (2012)). 
 187. Id. at 1356–57. 
 188. See id. at 1360 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)). 
 189. Id. at 1360 (citing Essar Steel Ltd. v. United States, 678 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012)). 
 190. Maverick Tube Corp. v. Toscelik Profil ve Sac Endustrisi A.S., 861 F.3d 1269, 
1271 (Fed. Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Maverick Tube II]. 
 191. 861 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 192. Id. at 1271. 
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an antidumping order in the United States receives a refund from 
previously paid import duties for foreign components provided the 
explorer exports the finished product.193  When that finished product 
is exported to the United States, the exporter can use that duty 
drawback to reduce its dumping margin by raising its export price by 
the amount of the duty drawback.194 
The appellant, Çayirova, operated in Turkey, which allows for a 
refund of import duties paid on inputs used in finished goods for 
exports as well as for imports of similar goods as those used in finished 
goods for export.195  Çayirova’s goods that were subject to the 
antidumping order and exported to the United States did not contain 
imported components that garnered a duty refund from the government 
of Turkey; however, Çayirova imported similar inputs—not used in the 
finished goods at issue here—for which they did receive duty 
refunds.196  Çayirova contended that Commerce should use those 
refunds to offset its dumping margin by raising its export price.197 
Commerce countered that point, asserting that, because Çayirova did 
not use any of the inputs for which the Government of Turkey provided 
a refund of duties, Çayirova was not entitled to a duty drawback 
adjustment.198  Commerce’s interpretation of the applicable statute was 
that an exporter is only entitled to a duty drawback adjustment when the 
duties refunded were on inputs used to manufacture the finished 
                                               
 193. Id. 
When calculating the dumping margin, 
if a foreign country would normally impose an import duty on an 
input used to manufacture the subject merchandise, but offers a 
rebate or exemption from the duty if the input is exported to the 
United States, then Commerce will increase [the export price] to 
account for the rebated or unpaid import duty (the “duty drawback”). 
. . . “The purpose of the duty drawback adjustment is to account for the fact 
that the producers remain subject to the import duty when they sell the subject 
merchandise domestically, which increases home market sales prices and 
thereby increases [the normal value].” 
Id. (quoting Saha Thai Steel Pipe (Public) Co. v. United States, 635 F.3d 1335, 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
 194. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(B) (2012) (providing that the export price “shall 
be . . . increased by . . . the amount of any import duties imposed by the country of 
exportation which have been rebated, or which have not been collected, by reason of 
the exportation of the subject merchandise to the United States”). 
 195. Maverick Tube II, 861 F.3d at 1271–72. 
 196. Id. at 1272. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
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products exported to the United States under the antidumping order.199  
In response, Çayirova argued that the statute was unambiguous and did 
not allow Commerce to impose its own “threshold test.”200 
The Federal Circuit analyzed Commerce’s interpretation using 
Chevron’s201 two-step analysis.  First, the court asked whether Congress 
unambiguously spoke about the specific issue in the statute.202  The 
Federal Circuit concluded that, while the statute was unambiguous for 
other issues, Congress did not address this specific issue, and thus, 
Commerce had discretion to apply its own interpretation.203  Second, 
the Federal Circuit assessed whether Commerce’s interpretation was 
reasonable, providing great discretion to Commerce.204  Here, the 
Federal Circuit found that Commerce’s interpretation was reasonable, 
and that it made sense to exclude refunds on inputs that were not used 
in manufacturing the product exported to the United States.205  Thus, 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s findings.206 
J. Apex Frozen Foods Private Ltd. v. United States 
In Apex Frozen Foods Private Ltd. v. United States,207 the Federal Circuit 
addressed a challenge to Commerce’s methodology to calculate 
antidumping duties on the export of “certain frozen warmwater shrimp 
from India.”208  On appeal, the CIT upheld Commerce’s methodology 
of applying the average-to-transaction and zeroing approaches to 
calculate the dumping margin.209 
                                               
 199. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(B)). 
 200. Id. at 1272–73 (articulating Commerce’s threshold test as prohibiting a duty 
drawback adjustment “when the exempted goods could not be used as inputs to 
produce the subject merchandise”); see also Saha Thai Steel Pipe (Public) Co. v. United 
States, 635 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(B) 
(2012)) (addressing whether “Commerce may only increase [the export value] when 
import duties are ‘imposed by the country of exportation’ and then later rebated” 
rather than when the import duties “have not been collected” to begin with). 
 201. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 202. Maverick Tube II, 861 F.3d at 1273–74 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 1274. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. 862 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 208. Id. at 1340.  Apex Frozen Foods, a non-mandatory respondent, challenged the 
results of Commerce’s eighth administrative review of the antidumping order on the 
Indian warmwater shrimp.  Id. 
 209. Apex Frozen Foods Private Ltd. v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 3d 1308 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2016), aff’d, 862 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Apex Frozen Foods, 862 F.3d at 1340; 
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In Apex Frozen Foods, Commerce found a pattern of export prices that 
differed significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time.210  
With this finding, Commerce applied the exception and used the average-
to-transaction approach to assess targeted dumping.211  Apex, among 
others, argued that Commerce did not reasonably justify the use of this 
method over the average-to-average method.212  Analyzing Commerce’s 
action under Chevron, the Federal Circuit found the applicable statute 
ambiguous and concluded that Commerce’s application of the meaningful 
difference test was a reasonable explanation for its use of the average-to-
transaction methodology.213  In sum, the Federal Circuit upheld the CIT’s 
decision, finding Commerce’s application of the average-to-transaction 
methodology in this case reasonable.214 
K. Diamond Sawblades Manufacturers Coalition v. United States 
In Diamond Sawblades Manufacturers Coalition v. United States,215 the 
Federal Circuit examined an antidumping order on Chinese exporters of 
diamond sawblades.216  Because China is considered an NME, Commerce 
“begins with a rebuttable presumption that all companies within the 
country are subject to government control” and thus their home-market 
pricing data cannot be relied upon to establish a home market price.217  
Here, the subject exporter, Advanced Tech and Materials Company 
(“ATM”), established an absence of government control and was 
afforded a separate rate of 2.50%, compared to the country-wide rate 
of 82.12% on the subject goods.218  Diamond Sawblades Manufacturers 
Coalition, on behalf of the domestic industry in the United States, 
challenged Commerce’s separate rate determination.219  After hearing 
the case, the CIT remanded to Commerce so it could explain how it 
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established the separate rate.220  On remand, Commerce once again 
concluded that ATM “was entitled to the separate rate of 2.50%.”221  On 
second appeal, CIT once again concluded that Commerce “failed to 
consider important aspects of the problem.”222  In the second remand, 
Commerce switched its position and concluded that ATM had failed to 
rebut the presumption of government control.223 
In Commerce’s final determination, it found that ATM lacked 
independent management because four of its senior officials on the 
board and the other five board members were nominated by the China 
Iron & Steel Research Institute, which is wholly-owned by the State-Owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commissions of the State Council 
of China.224  ATM was subjected to the then China-wide rate of 
164.09%.225  However, given that ATM fully cooperated with the 
investigation during the first administrative review, and that ATM was 
subjected to the China-wide rate, Commerce decided to update the 
China-wide rate by averaging the no longer applicable ATM separate duty 
rate of 0.15% and the China-wide rate, yielding a new China-wide rate of 
82.12%.226  On appeal, the CIT upheld Commerce’s recalculation.227 
ATM argued that its cooperation during the first administrative review 
should qualify it for a separate rate.228  It contended the application of 
the China-wide rate to entities that cooperate creates a disincentive for 
cooperation.229  The Federal Circuit disagreed and held that the China-
wide rate would always include the rebuttable presumption that an 
entity is not state-controlled; however, failure to rebut that presumption 
would subject an entity to the China-wide rate.230  The Federal Circuit 
noted that “the fact of cooperation may help an entity in a NME country 
seek a reduction of the country-wide rate, as it did here, but it does not, 
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without more, save it from that rate.”231 
CONCLUSION 
The effect of an antidumping duty or a classification that bears a higher 
tariff rate can have dramatic economic effects on foreign exporters to the 
United States.232  One extensive firm-level study of Chinese exporters 
found that antidumping duties imposed by the United States resulted in 
a twelve percent decline in labor productivity in those targeted Chinese 
firms.233  Additionally, a 2006 study by a Department of Justice antitrust 
attorney on the effects of antidumping duties on the levels of foreign 
imports to the United States reported, despite a lack of evidence, a 0.9% 
decline in imports because of those duties.234 
Recent trends show that China remains the most investigated 
exporter for potential dumping and immediate goods, usually related to 
the steel industry, which tends to be the sector most frequently 
challenging those dumping orders.235  It is also worth noting that 
antidumping and countervailing duty cases have been more frequently 
combined, rather than filed as separate cases as was practice in the 
past,236 as seen in Maverick Tube II.237  More activity in the steel sector and 
with China can be expected, especially as U.S. protectionism increases 
and trade tensions continue to grow.238 
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